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Abstract
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) have already driven millions of
miles on public roads, but even the simplest scenarios have
not been certified for safety. Current methodologies for the
verification of AV’s decision and control systems attempt to
divorce the lower level, short-term trajectory planning and
trajectory tracking functions from the behavioral rules-based
framework that governs mid-term actions. Such analysis is
typically predicated on the discretization of the state space and
has several limitations. First, it requires that a conservative
buffer be added around obstacles such that many feasible plans
are classified as unsafe. Second, the discretized controllers
modeled in this analysis require several refinement steps
before being implementable on an actual AV, and typically do
not allow the specification of comfort-related properties on
the trajectories. Consumer-ready AVs use motion planning
algorithms that generate smooth trajectories. While viable
algorithms exist for the generation of smooth trajectories origi-
nating from a single state, analysis should consider that the AV
faces state estimation errors and disturbances. Verification is
restricted to a discretized state space with fixed-size cells; this
assumption can artificially limit the set of available trajectories
if the discretization is too coarse. Conversely, too fine of a
discretization renders the problem intractable for automated
analysis. This work presents a new verification tool, APEX,
which investigates the combined action of a behavioral planner
and state lattice-based motion planner to guarantee a safe
vehicle trajectory is chosen. In APEX, decisions made at the
behavioral layer can be traced through to the spatio-temporal
evolution of the AV and verified. Thus, there is no need to
create abstractions of the AV’s controllers, and aggressive
trajectories required for evasive maneuvers can be accurately
investigated.
Introduction
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and fully au-
tonomous vehicles (AVs) feature a complex integration between
discrete and continuous controllers. The discrete controllers
make decisions regarding the vehicle’s next goal (“move to left
lane”), while the continuous controllers determine throttle and
steering inputs which allow the vehicle to execute the decisions
of the discrete controller.
Approximately 1.25 million traffic accidents occur yearly
around the world; almost 90% of such accidents are attributable
to driver error [1]. ADAS and AV technology has the potential
to all but eliminate this burden from society; however, experts
are still unsure when such technology will be ready for the con-
sumer market. Thus, as such vehicles come to market there is a
pressing need to bound and minimize the risks they might pose
to other vehicles, pedestrians and infrastructure.
Legal liability is a main consideration in the design of the
next generation of vehicles, and could determine the future of
ADAS and AVs as a mainstream technology. The question is:
who’s liable when the AV (or an ADAS feature) causes an acci-
dent or unsafe situation? Currently there is no one answer to the
question: on the ADAS side, Tesla Motors has included a lane
changing feature; however, it must be initiated by the human
driver as a way to make the latter ultimately responsible for the
outcomes.
Volvo on the other hand has recently announced it will as-
sume full liability for its autonomous cars’ actions, and warns
that “the US risks losing its leading position due to the lack
of Federal guidelines for the testing and certification of au-
tonomous vehicles” [2]. The possibility that the manufacturer
might ultimately be deemed responsible for the car’s actions
highlights the urgent need for a technology that can automati-
cally and exhaustively certify the impossibility of accidents in
various driving scenarios, and under well-defined conditions.
It is clear that, for now, next generation AVs will remain re-
search projects because there is a lack of confidence that they
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can be used in safety critical applications. More specifically,
there are currently few tools for plan verification and execution
analysis [3]. New, more practical methods, for formal verifi-
cation and model based design could increase the confidence
that highly autonomous systems can be put into service and can
potentially reduce both development costs and time to market.
A successful tool must handle a large variety of scenarios in
which the AVs will operate: for example, highway driving, en-
trance ramps, roundabouts, and stoplights. Furthermore, each
scenario has a large number of variations: highway driving in-
volves a varying number of cars and different starting configu-
rations of the cars. These configurations define the traffic par-
ticipants relative positions, their initial speeds, orientations, and
their goals. The configuration space can be extremely large, and
in fact, is often uncountably infinite, as can be seen by consider-
ing that a car’s position is a real-valued variable. In this paper,
we address two questions: (1) Is it possible to investigate all
configurations via symbolic abstraction? (2) If it is, how can
we verify that the car’s behavior is correct in all configurations?
Here, correct means that the vehicle is both safe and achieves
the mobility goals of the pilot.
The most common approach today to verifying the safety
and correctness of the car’s controllers is to perform a large
number of simulations and tests. Every simulation varies the
scenario configuration: in one simulation the cars start 0.7m
away from each other, in another they start 2m apart with equal
speeds, in yet a third they start 2m apart with the lead vehi-
cle making a left turn. However, simulation always leaves a
verification gap. To illustrate this gap, we focus on a common
scenario: the lane change.
Simulating a lane change
Consider the situations presented in Fig. 1, all of which are
variations on a lane change scenario. Every car in the scenario
is characterized by its state x which includes at least its posi-
tion, velocity, orientation and yaw rate. In general, additional
variables might be used to describe the state of the car at ev-
ery time instant. In this example, we use a 7-dimensional state.
To simulate the scenario, we select initial values for these vari-
ables, i.e., an initial state x(0) (which we called configuration).
Note for this example that once an initial state is fixed, the sys-
tem evolves deterministically based on the controllers of each
car. The initial state can have any value in a bounded set: e.g.,
in Fig. 1, the initial position (sx, sy) of the ego vehicle is in
[0, 1]×[0, 1], and the velocity v is in [24, 33]m/s. There are two
distinct sources for uncertainty about the state: first, the ego ve-
hicle will have to perform a lane change under a variety of initial
states. Simulating it under only one initial state is clearly insuf-
ficient, because we expect the outcome of the scenario when
the two cars start 0.5m apart to differ from its outcome when
the two cars start 5m apart. The second source of uncertainty
comes from errors in perception such as localization and veloc-
ity estimate. Even if we wish to start the simulation in a par-
ticular state, inaccuracies in measurements mean that the car’s
state can not be exactly known. So while the control algorithms
assume a given starting state, the car may actually begin from
anywhere in a bounded set around that state estimate. Thus it’s
important to verify that these measurement errors do not cause
unsafe situations.
Figure 1: Simulation is not sufficient to fully verify a lane
change. After a large number of simulations, the unsafe sce-
nario at the bottommay still not be detected as simulation-based
testing is not exhaustive and leaves a verification gap.
The question then becomes: how many simulations should
we perform, and which simulations should we perform? Ide-
ally, we would simulate all configurations that produce an un-
safe outcome, but this can not be guaranteed in general. Even
experienced engineers might not think of corner cases, espe-
cially given the size of the vehicles configuration space. E.g., in
Fig. 1, we show a lane change scenario, which has been simu-
lated a 1000 times, including with varying numbers of vehicles.
Yet, it is only the last, non-simulated, situation that reveals the
collision: if the ego vehicle starts with a positive orientation and
yaw rate, and attempts to change lanes while the other vehicle
is slowing down, it could cause a collision. This is because the
ego vehicle is unable to exactly follow the reference trajectory
which the motion planner determined would be safe.
Randomized testing, where the configurations are sampled
from hypercubes of parameters, is not a scalable solution: sup-
pose we decide to sample only 10 points in the range of every
state variable. For our 7D model, and with 2 cars, this yields a
total of 1014 simulations. Say we wish to simulate 10 seconds.
Even if a simulation runs in real-time, this still requires 10∗1014
seconds = 30 million years to complete.
Thus, while simulations are a useful and intuitive method for
getting a quick confidence level in the basic safety of a scenario,
they are not sufficient for guaranteeing the absence of risk in a
given scenario with a bounded state space.
Contributions
Our main contribution is a design-time approach to formally
verifying the trajectory planning and trajectory tracking stacks
of an ADAS/AV as they interact with potentially dynamic par-
ticipants in a variety of driving scenarios. This approach is im-
plemented in a software tool, APEX, and illustrated with exam-
ples of a lane change maneuver. The verification approach has
two characteristics:
• It is formal: we are guaranteed that if APEX determines a
scenario to be safe, then it is safe. No amount of simulation
can find an unsafe behavior in a scenario verified as correct
by APEX.
• It allows the use of an arbitrary trajectory planner, for ex-
ample, it could be code or an abstraction. That is, there is
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no need to model the trajectory planner, which is often very
complex software. Moreover, the same trajectory planner
can then be run on a real vehicle. In the case study pre-
sented in this paper, APEX uses a trajectory planner that
has been tested on a real vehicle.
In APEX, the verification engineer can
• Specify the low-level dynamics of the vehicle, including
the trajectory tracker. Unlike other approaches and exist-
ing tools the dynamics can be nonlinear. The default model
in APEX is a 7D bicycle model.
• Provide a motion planner that takes in a starting position
and end position and returns a trajectory that links the two
points. The motion planner can be any piece of software:
there are no restrictions on it. The default planner in APEX
is a state lattice planner incorporated in ROS and tested on
a real vehicle. Figure 2 shows the planner GUI available
as part of Autoware [4].
• Specify a sequence of goal positions (or waypoints) that
the vehicle must visit, or a behavioral planner that com-
putes these waypoints in a reactive manner. The default
behavioral planner in APEX is a simple 2-state automa-
ton that decides whether to execute lane following or lane
changing. However, we expect that designers will imple-
ment many other more complex behavioral planners.
• Specify the uncertainty sets for the ego vehicle and the
other agents in the scenario.
• Specify the unsafe conditions to be avoided by the vehicle.
APEX supports a rich specification language, Metric Inter-
val Temporal Logic (MITL) for the description of unsafe
behaviors [5].
APEX will then verify, in an exhaustive fashion, that the
ego vehicle can complete the scenario under the specified uncer-
tainty, or return a specific case where it fails. The engineers can
then use this counter-example in order to debug the controllers,
and better understand how to avoid this failure at design-time.
Figure 2: ROS APEX planning implementation GUI.
One real-world example of an AV software bug related to
plan execution was highlighted by the first ever crash between
AVs at the Urban Challenge [6]. At the time of the accident,
participants noted that there are no known “formal methods that
would allow definitive statements about the completeness or
correctness of a vehicle interacting with a static environment,
much less a dynamic one” [7]. It is beyond the scope of this
Figure 3: The three layer architecture presented by Gat is
widely accepted as a standard means of implementing planning
and control for an autonomous vehicle.
paper to review the numerous developments in verification and
synthesis technology; we note attempts exist to reason about the
safety of autonomous vehicles in static environments via syn-
thesis [8], but such methods cannot currently scale to realistic
systems and are extremely conservative. In response the au-
thors of [8] propose a receding horizon framework, but still rely
on coarse grid-based abstractions. Others have sought to verify
Adaptive Cruise Control Algorithms (ACC) which severely re-
strict scenarios in which the car may operate (no lane changes)
[9]. Finally, some research which eschews discretization in fa-
vor of continuous linearized dynamics focuses on moving the
verification task online [10].
APEX description and usage
Planning and Control for Autonomous Vehicles
In order to motivate the need for the APEX approach, we first
outline the architecture of a typical ADAS/AV control system.
It is not necessary that a vehicle use this particular architecture
in order to be verified under APEX, but it motivates the key is-
sues involved in obtaining a proof of safety. In the three-layer
architecture paradigm [11] which we demonstrate, the planning
and control of the vehicle is hierarchical in nature. Each suc-
cessive layer performs a task over a shorter time horizon. Fig.
3 details this approach to AV architecture.
At the top level a mission planner is given a mobility goal.
Such a goal is typically expressed as a (current location, destina-
tion) pair. Given this pair the mission planner finds an optimal
(or feasible) route through the road network.
In the next layer, the behavioral planner makes local deci-
sions about how to navigate the road network. For example, if
the mission planner informs the behavioral planner that at the
next intersection it will need to turn left, the behavioral planner
will use a set of rules to determine that the ego vehicle must be
in the left lane. It then provides a sequence of waypoints, or
intermediary destinations, to the lower-level local planner.
Finally, the local planner, or trajectory planner, produces a
trajectory that connects the vehicle’s current pose to the target
pose at the next waypoint. Here ‘pose’ refers to the combined
position, heading and velocity of the vehicle. Specifically, given
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Figure 4: Reachability Analysis is a means of formal verifi-
cation which shows that for a given initial set and a specified
unsafe set, no trajectory of the system can reach the unsafe set
Figure 5: One step in the APEX tool: the local planner gener-
ates a trajectory, which is automatically input into the mission
description file and verified using dReach
a goal pose relative to the vehicle’s current pose, the local plan-
ner computes a set of candidate smooth trajectories that can lead
to the goal pose or near it, then selects a single trajectory and
sends it to the vehicle. The vehicle itself includes a PID con-
troller (or some other controller) in order to track the selected
trajectory.
Reachability
APEX applies recent techniques in reachability analysis [12]
to the verification of hybrid systems. Hybrid systems provide
a precise and formal means of describing models which have
both continuous state variables and discrete operating modes,
and are an appropriate model for autonomous vehicles as will be
shown. Reachability analysis asks the following question: given
an initial set of states of the system, and an unsafe set of states
that the system should not visit, is it possible for the system
to reach the unsafe set if it starts in the initial set? See Fig.
4. A reachability tool either answers the question negatively
(the system is safe), or it provides a particular execution of the
system that enters the unsafe set. Such an exectution is known
as a counter-example.
The APEX Approach
APEX answers the following question by re-formulating it as a
reachability problem: given some initial uncertainty about the
state of the AV, constraints on the configuration of the environ-
ment, and a desired behavior of the AV (like mobility goal and
traffic laws), is it ever possible for the AV to violate the desired
behavior? Fig. 5 summarizes a single execution of the verifica-
tion engine. For each trajectory selected by the planner (high-
lighted in red), APEX calls dReach [13], a reachability analysis
tool for nonlinear hybrid systems.
We emphasize that the verification process is offline - the
vehicle does not run APEX while it is driving. At each deci-
sion point encountered by the behavioral planner there may be
multiple executions of the verification engine depending on the
design of the behavioral planner. Fig. 6 describes how the ex-
ecution of the controller online relates to the offline verification
process. In contrast to the simulation based approach outlined
in the introduction, the result of the APEX approach is that we
have converted a brute force search over real intervals into a
finite series of tractable bounded reachability problems over a
finite verification horizon.
Tool Input
APEX is a command line tool for verification of autonomous
vehicle missions written in Python and C++. The input to the
verification process is amission definition file. Themission defi-
nition file defines the sequence of waypoints or road links which
the vehicle will traverse in order to achieve a mobility goal.
The mission defintion file describes the following:
• The collection of agents in the scenario, consisting of the
ego vehicle and other cars in the scenario. The agents are
described via ODEs that describe the evolution of their
state with time, and their behavioral planners, which give
the next waypoints for each vehicle. All agents operate in
an ontology specific to the mission, in this case the world
model consists of a geometric description of a road net-
work.
• Set of initial states for each state variable of every vehicle.
• The constraints that the AV should satisfy, such as traffic
laws and the unsafe conditions that ego vehicle must avoid.
These are described in MITL.
• The goal of the ego vehicle, also expressed in MITL.
The mission definition file is part of a mission definition
script. The latter manages the execution of the behavioral plan-
ner and trajectory generator. Each (state, goal) pair that is en-
countered on the mission generates at least one trajectory which
must be verified. Themission definition script automatically up-
dates a scenario verification instance. The scenario verification
instance is a dReach (.drh) file which combines the results of
the plan execution with the dynamical model of the vehicle and
a low-level trajectory tracking controller. The agent definition
file contains the dynamical model of the vehicle and the track-
ing controller is also written using the syntax of dReach, it may
be manually edited in order to match mission specific vehicle
models. We provide an example of the syntax of the composed
scenario verification instance in Fig. 7.
Together, the constraints of the environment ξ and ego ve-
hicle goal and constraints φ constitute the specification of the
mission. The mission is a success if every execution of the sys-
tem (i.e., every simulation) satisfies the specification.
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Local Planner Execution: LF
Figure 6: Stages of APEX verification and their correspondence to control execution. Top left: at t = 0, mode is Lane Follow (LF) and the vehicle
follows the current lane. Top right: at t = 1, mode is Lane Change (LC) and vehicle starts a lane change maneuver. Bottom left: offline, APEX verifies
that in mode LF, the vehicle can track the trajectory. Bottom right: offline, APEX verifies both possible executions, a lane change and a lane following.
Tool Output
Each scenario verification instance can return either SAFE or
δ-UNSAFE. SAFE means that for all possible executions of the
system we can not reach an unsafe state. δ-UNSAFE means
that there exists an execution of the system which comes within
a δ of the unsafe region, and possibly enters it. If the system
is δ-UNSAFE the tool will return a counter-example describing
a tube around a concrete trajectory whose intersection with the
unsafe region is not empty. Users of the APEX tool should
be aware that selecting too large of a precision value (δ) may
result in δ-UNSAFE results which are false positives, but any
declaration of SAFE is guaranteed to be correct.
Building an Autonomous Vehicle Agent
To run APEX, we need to capture the AV dynamics, the low
level tracking controller, and the planning stack which generates
the trajectories for the vehicle to follow.
Modeling
The first step towards verification is a model of the AV. APEX
uses the formalism of nonlinear hybrid systems to describe the
AV and other vehicles. The trajectory tracking controller and
AV can be described using ordinary differential equations. The
discrete nature of the behavioral control layer dictates that we
much capture a system with mixed continuous-discrete dynam-
ics. We provide a list of symbols used in Table 1.
Ego Vehicle Model
APEX uses a non-linear 7 degree of freedom bicycle model [14]
in order to describe the ego-vehicle. Higher order models can be
supported in the future, and of course the parameters of the base
model can be customized in order to match specific vehicles.
See Fig. 8. The input to such a model is steering angle velocity
and linear velocity, the output is vehicle state as a function of
time.
The state vector describing the vehicle is described in equa-
tions (1)-(7). The variable β is the slip angle at the center of
mass, ψ is the heading angle, ψ˙ is the yaw rate, v is the velocity,
sx and sy are the x and y positions, and δ is the angle of the front
wheel. In the formulation of [6], the inputs to the system are ax,
the longitudinal acceleration, and vw the rotational speed of the
steering angle.
xv = (β,Ψ, Ψ˙, v, sx, sy, δ) (1)
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Figure 7: Scenario verification instance generated by APEX
The state equations for the system as described in [15] are:
β˙ =
(
Crlr − Cf lf
mv2
)
ψ˙ +
(
Cf
mv
)
δ −
(
Cf + Cr
mv
)
β (2)
ψ¨ =
(
Crlr − Cf lf
Iz
)
β −
(
Cf l
2
f − Crl2r
Iz
)(
ψ˙
v
)
+
(
Cf lf
Iz
)
δ (3)
Figure 8: Nonlinear bicycle model describing the statespace for
the APEX approach to vehicle dynamics
Table 1: Symbols for Vehicle Model
Symbol List
Symbol Units Description
xv - Verification State Vector
xsl - Lattice Planning State Vector
xp - Vehicle Pose
xg - Goal Pose
xf - Predicted Vehicle Pose
p - Cubic Spline Parameter Vector
tf s Prediction Horizon
m kg Vehicle Mass
lr m Rear Wheelbase
lf m Front Wheelbase
Iz kg m2 Moment of Inertia
Cf N/rad Front Cornering Stiffness
Cr N/rad Rear Cornering Stiffness
β rad Slip Angle
Ψ rad Heading Angle
v m/s Velocity
sx m Position, x
sy m Position, y
δ rad Steering Angle
x m Tracking Error, x
y m Tracking Error, y
vw rad/s Steering Angle Velocity
ax m/s2 Longitudinal Acceleration
κ rad/m Curvature
sf m Arc Length
v˙ = ax (4)
s˙x = v cos (β + ψ) (5)
s˙y = v sin (β + ψ) (6)
δ˙ = vw (7)
Vehicle Parameters
The parameters Cf , Cr and lf , lr describe respectively the cor-
nering stiffness and distances from the center of gravity to the
axles respectively; the subscripts f, r denote whether the pa-
rameter is defined for the front or rear of the vehicle. The mo-
ment of inertia, Iz and the vehicle mass, m are experimentally
determined constants [16]. The kinematic bicycle model con-
siders the two front wheels and two rear wheels of the vehicle
to move in unison, with steering provided by the front wheels
only. Furthermore, Each abstracted wheel is located along the
center of the vehicle’s body. Table 2 contains the validated ve-
hicle parameters as given in [15]. It is possible to obtain such
parameters and replace these constants in order to investigate
specific vehicle characteristics.
Table 2: Parameters of Example Ego Vehicle [15]
Vehicle Parameters
m(kg) Iz(kg*m2) Cf (N/rad) Cr(N/rad) lf (m) lr(m)
2273 4423 10.8e4 10.8e4 1.292 1.515
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Tracking Controller
A simple trajectory tracking controller is included with the
APEX vehicle model. Trajecotry tracking controllers guide a
vehicle along a geometrically defined cubic spline by apply
steering and longitudinal acceleration inputs. A successful path
tracking algorithm maintains vehicle stability and attempts to
minimize the error between the desired trajectory and actual
trajectory. The parameters computed for this controller when
implemented and validated on a typical crossover SUV [15] are
presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Controller Parameters [15]
Controller Parameters
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6
2 12 4 2 1 1.515
Using the approach in [16] and [15] the control inputs for
longitudinal acceleration (pressing the accelerator) and steering
angle velocity (turning the steering wheel) can be computed as
vw and ax respectively.
vw = k1(cos(Ψd)(sy,d − sy − wy)− sin(Ψd)(sx,d − sx − wx))
+k2(Ψd −Ψ− wΨ)
+k3(Ψ˙d − Ψ˙− wψ)− k4(δ − wδ) (8)
ax = k5(cos(Ψd)(sx,d − sx − wx) + sin(Ψd)(sy,d − sy − wy))
+k6(vd − v − wv) (9)
We note that we cannot use traditional linear systems tech-
niques or sum of squares optimizations to directly find a Lya-
punov function for this system because of the obvious non-
linearity and non-polynomial form of the governing ordinary
differential equations. Instead we will seek to show stability and
safety properties using reachability and model checking analy-
sis.
Planning
In APEX we provide a validated planning stack which can be
run on a real vehicle. The planning strategy is hierarchical
and includes: mission planning, behavioral planning, and lo-
cal planning. In this section we will focus on the local planner
because it is the layer which connects directly to the tracking
controller for the vehicle. The local planner is used to generate
smooth trajectories which a non-holonomic dynamically con-
strained vehicle is capable of following. Our planning stack
utilizes the methods outlined in [17] commonly known as state-
lattice planning with cubic spline trajectory generation.
Each execution of the planner requires as an input the cur-
rent state of the vehicle and a goal state as defined by the be-
havioral planner. We note that we will call the vehicle state
xsl because it does not necessarily have to be the same as the
model used for verification (although it can be). The planner
must run online, in real-time, therefore, lower order models are
often substituted here. In this implementation we define xsl as:
xsl = (sx, sy, v,Ψ, κ) (10)
Where sx and sy are the x and y positions of the center of
mass, v is the velocity, Ψ is the heading angle, and κ is the
Figure 9: Details of a local planning algorithm and used by AVs
employing state lattice planning
curvature. We note that the state equations involve an additional
constant, L which is the wheelbase of the vehicle. Where the
state equations are described as:
x˙ = v ∗ cos(Ψ) (11)
y˙ = v ∗ sin(Ψ) (12)
θ˙ = κ ∗ v (13)
κ˙ =
Ψ˙
L
(14)
The local planner’s objective is then to find a feasible trajec-
tory from the initial state defined by the tuple xsl to a goal pose
xp defined as:
xp = (sx, sy,Ψ) (15)
In this formulation we limit trajectories to a specific class of
parameterized curves known as cubic splines. A cubic spline is
defined as a function of arc length:
κ(s) = κ0 + aκ1s+ bκ2s
2 + cκ3s
3 (16)
Note that there are four free parameters (a, b, c, sf ) and our
goal posture has four state variables. Thus, a cubic spline is a
minimal polynomial that can be assured to produce a trajectory
from the current position to the goal position (if it is kinemati-
cally feasible). For any particular state, goal pair there are two
steps necessary to compute the parameters. First, it is necessary
to produce an initial guess. There are several approaches avail-
able such as using a neural network, lookup table, or a simple
heuristic. In this case we adapt a heuristic from Nagy and Kelly
[18] such that it is compatible with a stable parameter formula-
tion presented by McNaughton [17]. The stable reparameteri-
zation is defined as:
κ(0) = p0 (17)
κ(sf/3) = p1 (18)
κ(2sf/3) = p2 (19)
κ(sf ) = p3 (20)
7
Figure 10: Output of an execution (10 Hz) of the trajectory gen-
erator, a single trajectory will be chosen from this set.
Where the parameters (a, b, c, sf ) can now be expressed as:
a(p) = p0 (21)
b(p) = −11p0 − 18p1 + 9p2 − 2p3
2sf
(22)
c(p) =
9 ∗ (2p0 − 5p1 + 4p2 − p3)
2s2f
(23)
d(p) = −9(p0 − 3p1 + 3p2 − p3)
2s3f
(24)
Which results in the following initialization heuristic:
p0 = κ0 = κi (25)
p1 = κ1 =
1
49
(8b(sf − si)− 26κ0 − κ3) (26)
p2 = κ2 =
1
4
(κ3 − 2κ0 + 5κ1) (27)
p3 = κ3 = κf (28)
Finally, with an initial guess in hand, and a stable re-
parameterization the local planner can solve a simple gradient
descent problem to drive the vehicle to the goal posture.
Thus, we can now compute a set of parameterized trajec-
tories which may each be evaluated to test for safety and op-
timality. A description of these aspects of the planner may be
found in [17] and such a cost function can obviously be mod-
ified based on the goals of the design team. We note that our
algorithm implementation is parallelized using OpenMP such
that multiple trajectories (with goals regularly sampled around
the initial goal) may be evaluated simultaneously. Furthermore,
with small changes we can also support quintic splines which
expand the variety of possible maneuvers and are more suitable
for high speed driving. Figure 10 shows an example of a trajec-
tory generation instance.
Specification
Formal verification requires both a system model and a speci-
fication. This means that the project stakeholders must provide
an exact definition of the desirable system properties. Further-
more, it is often the case that such properties are expressed as
occurring only under certain conditions. For convenience we
provide the symbols used to describe the vehicle specification
in Table 4.
Table 4: Symbols for Specifications
Symbol List
Symbol Units Description
k - Search Depth
φ - Ego Vehicle Spec
ξ - Environment Spec
LC Boolean Lane Change Request
LO Boolean Lane Occupied
vego m/s Velocity of Ego Vehicle
sxego m Position of Ego Vehicle, x
syego m Position of Ego Vehicle, y
vlimit m/s Speed Limit
sxref m Centerline Reference, x
syref m Centerline Reference, y
w(sxref , syref ) m Lane Width
B m Buffer
r m Collision Radius
t s Current Timestep
tmax s Max Timestep
2 - Always
→ - Implies
¬ - Not
∧ - And
∨ - Or
An example specification follows: the ego vehicle should
drive in the selected lane at the speed limit unless a stop sign
is encountered. We note that the traffic laws of a given region
provide a partial, but informal definition of many of the high
level specifications which the ego vehicle should adhere to.
Ego Vehicle Specifcation
The specification for the ego vehicle has two components:
safety properties and liveness properties. A specification for
the ego vehicle in the case study follows:
• The ego vehicle travels at a velocity less than or equal to
the speed limit
2 (vego ≤ vlimit) (29)
• The ego vehicle does not drive backwards
2 (vego ≥ 0) (30)
• The ego vehicle does not collide with any of the n other
objects in the environment
2
(√
(sxego − sxenvi )2 + (syego − syenvi )2 ≥ r
)
∀i = 1...n (31)
• If a timed lane change request is invoked, the ego vehicle
completes the lane change on time.
2
(
LC → (syego > w) ∧ (t ≤ tmax)) (32)
Environment Specification
The other vehicles operating within a scenario present both an
interesting challenge and a primary motivation for formal veri-
fication. It is clear that it is impossible to know the intentions of
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the agents operating such vehicles; their execution represents a
significant source of non-determinism. In fact, a more complex
model of such agents which includes details such as steering an-
gle or tire friction will not enable less conservative results, for
it is the control input not the plant that remains the largest un-
known. Thus, we conclude that: for verifying the autonomous
agent, only the perceptible behavior of other agents is impor-
tant, not their internal structure.
Still it remains clear that the behavior of other agents must
be part of the scenario description. As such we present a safety
case which assumes that other agents will follow a certain min-
imal set of driving rules. For brevity we will reference the fol-
lowing specification as ξ in the case studies.
• Acceleration ceases when some maximum velocity is
reached.
2 (venv ≥ vmax → a = 0) (33)
• Other agents must drive in the proper direction according
to their lane.
2 (venv ≥ 0) (34)
• The accelerations of other agents are within those rates
achievable by maximum engine power
2 (aenv ≤ amax) (35)
• Other agents maintain their lanes unless explicitly speci-
fied not to.
2 (¬LC → (ymin ≤ syenv ) ∧ (ymax ≥ syenv )) (36)
• Lane changes by other agents are only permitted if the al-
ternate lane is unoccupied or unless a degenerate scenario
is being modeled.
2 (LO → ¬LC) (37)
APEX internals and theory
APEX maintains an internal representation of the scenario as a
hybrid system. The components of this hybrid system are:
• The behavioral planners of all vehicles involved,
B1, . . . ,Bm. Fig. 11 shows the behavioral planner we used
in the case study for a lane change. A behavioral planner
is a finite state system. We will refer to each state of a
behavioral planner as a mode.
• For every vehicle, the continuous dynamics involved in
each of the modes of its behavioral planner. In general, dif-
ferent modes may require different dynamics: e.g. a Col-
lision Avoidance mode which is invoked when a collision
is imminent requires more stability control than a turn at
a low speed. The continuous dynamics are given in terms
of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) x˙i = fi(xi),
where xi ∈ Rn is the continuous state of the ith agent.
• For each vehicle, transition conditions between the modes
of the behavioral planner Bi are expressed in terms of the
state vector xi. The planner transitions between two modes
q and q′ only if a guard condition Gq,q′ is satisfied. In
general, the guard condition for Bi is expressed as a set
in the state space of all the agents, since transitions will
occur based on, for example, how close two vehicles are to
each other. Specifically, let x = (x1, . . . , xn) combine the
states xi of the individual vehicles. So x ∈ Rn·m. Then
there’s a transition between two states q and q′ of Bi only
if x ∈ Gqq′ ⊂ Rn·m. For example, there’s a LF-to-LC
transition only if the two cars are closer than 10m and the
following car is faster than the leading car. In this case
GLF,LC = {x | ||x1 − x2|| ≤ 10 ∧ v2 > v1}.
Together, these make up a hybrid system, so-called because it
combines discrete dynamics in the behavioral planner with con-
tinuous dynamics in each mode. We will refer to the n hybrid
systems of the n agents in the scenario as H1, . . . , Hm. The
state of the scenario x is simply x = (x1, . . . , xn).
APEX does not keep an internal representation of the motion
planner. Rather, as explained in earlier sections, APEX issues
calls to the motion planner in the course of the verification, and
obtains a trajectory from it.
APEX also needs to maintain a description of the scenario
specification. This specification is provided by the user and can
be any formula in first-order logic over the set of modes and
states of all agents. See the Case Study.For example the follow-
ing is a possible specification:
Mode1 = LC → |ψ˙| ≤ b
The following sections describe how APEX verifies a prop-
erty of the scenario using this internal representation.
Execution tree and formal model
Let B be a behavioral planner of a given vehicle. The for-
mal model of the behavioral planner is a finite transition sys-
tem B = (Q, q0,Σ,→) where Q is the finite set of modes,
q0 is the initial mode, Σ is a set of output labels, and →⊂
Q × Σ × Q is the labeled transition relation of the system.
We write q σ−→ q′ for (q, σ, q′) ∈−→. Fig. 11 shows the be-
havioral planner that is used by APEX by default for mod-
eling a lane change controller. It can be described as B =
({LC,LF}, LF,Rn, {(LF,LF ), (LF,LC), (LC,LF )}). In
mode LF, the vehicle’s goal is to follow the current lane. In
mode LC, the vehicle’s goal is to change lanes. In general, a
mode represents a decision by the controller, a behavior that the
vehicle should follow. With every transition between modes,
the behavioral planner outputs a vector xB in Rn: this is the
destination that the vehicle must reach. The planner transitions
between modes when certain guard conditions are satisfied.
The behavioral planner advances in discrete time. The dis-
crete time advances, for example, with every update of the ve-
hicle’s sensors. Thus B makes a decision on what to do ev-
erytime its information about the environment is updated. The
planner may decide to maintain the current decision, i.e., stay
in the same mode, if that mode has a self-loop. Mode LF has
a self-loop in Fig. 11. Let ∆t > 0 be the update period. Since
every scenario is time-limited, and every transition takes fixed
non-zero time ∆t, there is a natural limit D on the number of
decisions, or transitions, that can be taken in any given scenario.
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In the first step of the verification process, APEX builds an
execution tree: the root of the tree is the initial mode q0, and
every branch of the tree represents one possible sequence of
decisions, i.e. one possible execution of B. See Fig. 13 for the
execution tree of the behavioral planner of Fig. 11. Since the
number of transitions is bounded by D in a given scenario, this
tree has a depth at most D.
With the execution tree built, APEX must next verify that
the sequence of decisions taken by the behavioral planner
can be implemented by the low-level controllers. E.g., let
(LF,LF,LC) be a sequence of decisions of depth 3. In ev-
ery occurrence of LF, APEX must check that the vehicle can
indeed follow the lane, and in every occurrence of LC, APEX
must verify that the vehicle can indeed change lanes. In the
next section, we define what it means to ‘follow the lane’ and
’change lanes’ via the motion planner.
Calling the motion planner
After building the execution tree, APEX starts executing every
branch, starting at the root, which is the initial mode q0. The
initial set of continuous states is X0. A transition is taken if the
initial set intersects its guard. SinceX0 may intersect more than
one guard, then more than one transition are possible. APEX
explores all transitions (all branches) in the execution tree. In
each mode APEX enters, B will output a destination xB . For-
mally, xB is a scenario state, but in what remains, it is simpler
to think of it as the position that the ego vehicle must reach.
APEX then calls the motion planner to obtain the trajec-
tory that the vehicle will follow. Since the current state is only
known as a set XA, APEX sets the starting point of the trajec-
tory to be the center xA ofXA. The motion planner then returns
a trajectory starting at xA and ending in a neighborhood of xB .
The neighborhood shape and size are known to APEX and are
part of the motion planner’s description. Let that neighborhood
be XB . Note that APEX does not place any restrictions on the
motion planner’s operation and calls it as a black box. There-
fore, the actual motion planner that is used on the real car can
be used in the verification of the system. In this way the ver-
ification results are directly applicable to the actual deployed
software.
Verifying each trajectory
Once a trajectory is generated connecting xA ∈ XA to the
neighborhood XB of xB , it remains to verify that the ego ve-
hicle will always reach XB within a specified amount of time
T , regardless of where it starts in XA. To verify that the spec-
ification is satisfied, APEX builds a reachability problem. This
reachability problem is characterized by the following:
• The system: in this case, the system consists of the sce-
nario hybrid system.
• The target set: this is the set that the system should reach.
In this case the state of the ego vehicle x1 should reach
XB , and there are no target sets for the other agents.
• The unsafe set: this is the set that the scenario hybrid sys-
tem must not reach at any point in time. In this case, the
ego vehicle must not get closer than dmin to any other
agent in the scenario.
Figure 11: An automaton describing a simplistic behavior plan-
ner for lane changes
• A time bound: the target set must be reached within a cer-
tain amount of time T .
We call the above a bounded reachability problem. To solve
this problem, APEX passes it to dReach [12], a reachability
analysis tool for nonlinear hybrid systems. dReach answers the
question: is there a trajectory of the vehicle starting in XA that
will violate the constraints? (e.g. will not reach the target set
XB or will get too close to another vehicle). dReach returns one
of two answers. If the answer dReach returns is SAFE, then it
is guaranteed that no behavior of the ego vehicle will violate
the constraints. It should be stressed that this is a mathematical
guarantee: no amount of simulation in this case will reveal a
violation, because dReach guarantees that no such violation ex-
ists. If dReach answers δ-UNSAFE, then this means that there
exists a behavior of the ego vehicle which, when perturbed by
an amount δ > 0, violates the constraints. See Fig. 4. The
parameter δ can be set by the user. It suffices to choose δ small
enough so δ-SAT means the system is not robust since a small
perturbation of size δ could cause it to violate the constraints.
Case Study
We briefly introduce and expand on the concept of driving sce-
narios to help reason about inherently diverse situations and re-
quirements which an autonomous vehicle might face.
An unsafe lane change scenario
The following example describes a lane change scenario in the
context of a mission and mobility goals. In this description we
imply a valid local planning solution, and seek to verify that all
possible individual trajectories which are selected in the execu-
tion of the plan are safe. First, in Scenario 1 we will demon-
strate a dangerous condition that could have been missed un-
der testing or simulation. Next, in Scenario 2 we will show
how a refinement in the requirements on the perception sys-
tem or a refinement in the behavioral controller can lead to a
provably safe maneuver. Finally, in Scenario 3 we demonstrate
how a change in manufacturer specification can be accurately
assessed for safety. To perform verification, we employ dReach
version 3.15.10.02 on a Mac OSX laptop with Intel(R) Core
i7(R) 2.60GHz CPU and 16 GB memory, and the results are
provided in Table 5.
Scenario 1 (A simple lane change and goal) As shown in
Fig. 12, the ego vehicle is driving in the right lane of a
uni-directional two lane road network. Another car is driving
in front of the ego vehicle at a lower speed. We include
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the extreme case where the environmental vehicle stops. We
highlight that when there is significant uncertainty regarding
the ego vehicles orientation and that it may deviate (initially)
from the reference trajectory (dashed line) while the tracking
controller recovers. We note that the specification of the
environment and the ego-vehicle in this scenario are defined as
ξ and φ respectively.
Behavioral controller
We associate a behavioral controller B1 with Scenario 1. Figure
11 details the controller, where LC means “Lane Change” and
LF means “Lane Follow”. Table 5 records the parameters. It is
a simple finite state deterministic automaton. We note, that this
particular behavior controller is almost surely too simplistic to
cover all of the scenarios faced by an actual vehicle, neverthe-
less it illustrates how we may formally represent a set of rules
which instantiate certain behavior classes on an autonomous ve-
hicle. Similar examples have been published by Darpa Urban
Challenge participants []. Both controllers generated via rein-
forcement learning and reactive behavior controllers created via
synthesis may be represented as deterministic finite automatons.
As our current goal is to demonstrate that verification is possi-
ble, rather than the richness of the scenarios that the behavioral
controller can handle, we find this controller suitable.
Given any deterministic finite automaton it is possible to ex-
press as a computational logic tree. Such a tree is rooted in a
single state, is infinite in size, and represents a branching notion
of time; that is each state (moment in time) may split into mul-
tiple possible future worlds. As we will explain in the following
sections, such a representation is at the heart of the APEX ap-
proach and verification occurs over a bounded search depth on
such a computation tree.
We present the initialization of the scenario and the results
of the verification. Table 5 contains the initialization of each
parameter.
Verification and Result
Finally, for the lane change case, we define an additional con-
straint set Runsafe as well as a goal set representing the max-
imum allowable deviation from the goal state. Runsafe ex-
presses that the system fails if it still hasn’t changed lanes within
2 sec or it collides with the car ahead of it.
((sy < w) ∧ (t > 2)) ∨ ((sy < w) ∧ (sx−  > sxenv )) (38)
Then, using APEX we attempt to show that there is no
execution of the system which can enter Runsafe. How-
Figure 12: A lane change scenario that could have been missed
in testing due to nonintuitive and uncountably infinite set of ini-
tial conditions. This scenario is unsafe for certain inter-vehicle
buffer spacing and reachability analysis determines the mini-
mum spacing to achieve a safe lance change.
Figure 13: An automaton describing a simplistic behavior plan-
ner for Lane Following (LF) and Lane Changes (LC)
Table 5: Verification Results
Symbol Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
w 3.7 3.7 3.7
B 15 20 20
δ 0.1 0.1 0.1
vego [10.8, 11.1] [10.9, 11] [10.9, 11]
sxego [0.0, 0.5] [0.0, 0.5] [0.0, 0.5]
syego [0.0, 0.1] [0.0, 0.05] [0.0, 0.05]
Ψ [0.0, 0.1] [0.0, 0.1] [0.0, 0.2]
Search Depth 2 2 2
Verification Time (s) 30.821 373.924 36.166
Result δ-UNSAFE SAFE δ-UNSAFE
ever, because the system is incorrectly designed dReach returns
δ-UNSAFE.
A safe lane change scenario
Using the information and counterexample from the previous
scenario it is easy to see that the behavior controller must be
corrected in order to guarantee safety of the lane change sce-
nario.
Scenario 2 (A more conservative behavioral controller)
We begin with Scenario 1. In order to ensure the forward
safety of the vehicle we propose a small modification to the
behavioral controller of the vehicle, and furthermore require
that the ego vehicle’s localization system return estimates with
less uncertainty. Namely, we first increase the size of variable
buffer, so that the ego vehicle is forced to initiate a lane change
maneuver earlier. Secondly, we decrease the size of the initial
sets. Speed v now starts anywhere in [10.9, 11] and sy starts in
[0.0,0.05].
With these changes, dReal returns SAFE, meaning that no
trajectory of the system violates the constraints.
A supplier issues a specification change
Given that a safe controller has been found a supplier wishes
to know if they may reduce the accuracy of several key sensors
associated with localization of the ego vehicle. Such a speci-
fication change is known to add significant uncertainty to the
estimate of the ego vehicle’s heading angle during the planning
phase.
Scenario 3 (Large perception errors) We begin with Sce-
nario 2. In order to reflect the change in supplier specification
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we update the localization system return estimates to reflect
greater uncertainty. Namely, we increase the size of the intial
set for ego vehicle heading such that Ψ starts in [0.0,0.2].
The result of this modification is again δ-UNSAFE, because
the ego vehicle clips the rear bumper of the environmental ve-
hicle while executing the lane change maneuver. Again the en-
gineer in charge of the project may use the new information to
refine the controller design or reject the suppliers specification
change. In this way formal verification efforts can be a useful
tool in determining the requirements which sensors and percep-
tion systems must meet given a particular control algorithm.
Conclusion
APEX is a tool for formally verifying the trajectory planning
and tracking stacks of ADAS/AV cars. It can perform formal
verification on realistic autonomous vehicle planning stacks. In
this paper we demonstrate a case study which formally verifies
a lane change maneuver. Future work will incorporate more
complex behavioral controllers for other scenarios, including
synthesized planners, and will add a GUI to the tool as well as
a means of visualizing complex counterexamples.
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